Foreign Multinational Enterprises Operating in the United States Seek Sanctuary from Title VII Employment Discrimination Charges in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation by O\u27Brien, Christine Neylon et al.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 18
Number 3 Spring 1995 Article 3
1-1-1995
Foreign Multinational Enterprises Operating in the
United States Seek Sanctuary from Title VII
Employment Discrimination Charges in Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Christine Neylon O'Brien
Gerald A. Madek
Margo E. K. Reder
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christine Neylon O'Brien, Gerald A. Madek, and Margo E. K. Reder, Foreign Multinational Enterprises Operating in the United States
Seek Sanctuary from Title VII Employment Discrimination Charges in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 18 Hastings
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 531 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol18/iss3/3
Foreign Multinational Enterprises
Operating in the United States Seek
Sanctuary from Title VII Employment
Discrimination Charges in Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
By CHRiSTiNE NEYLON O'BRmN,* GERAL A. MADEK** and
MARGO E.K. REDER***
"Now our generation of Americans has been called on to continue the
unending search for justice within our own borders."
President Lyndon B. Johnson'
I. INTRODUCTION
International commercial treaties create rights for businesses of
signatory countries to select upper-level employees primarily from
among their own citizens for their subsidiaries abroad. This freedom
of selection is an exemption granted in bilateral Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN treaties) on the theory that
such latitude encourages foreign investment by ensuring that compa-
nies can better protect their businesses and investment in other coun-
tries by selecting their own key managers from their home office.
However, the breadth of latitude embedded in these free choice ex-
emptions (FCEs) contained in the numerous FCN treaties is currently
being questioned in light of the potential conflicts that may arise be-
tween the FCEs and the Title VII employment rights of United States
nationals who compete for equal opportunities within U.S.-incorpo-
rated subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs).
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Wallace E. Carroll School of Management,
Boston College. Professor O'Brien served as Professor of Law at Bentley College, and as
Visiting Professor of Business Law and also Associate Dean of the Carroll School of
Management.
** Associate Professor of Law, Bentley College.
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A typical charge arises when a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of a
foreign company fires U.S. citizens or nationals and replaces them
with citizens or nationals from the country of the foreign parent com-
pany. The U.S. citizens then file suit alleging discrimination. The sub-
sidiary will defend its practice by asserting that under the FCN Treaty,
the FCE clause allows it to give employment priority to citizens from
the country of its parent company, and that Title VII does not prohibit
citizenship discrimination (even while acknowledging that Title VII
prohibits national origin discrimination). To a great extent, this de-
fense relies upon a fiction that citizenship discrimination is different
from national origin discrimination, when in fact, the two characteris-
tics are virtually interchangeable in homogenous countries such as Ja-
pan. Thus, by allowing the subsidiary to favor its own citizens for key
positions, FCEs allow foreign companies to prefer their own nationals,
in violation of Title VII.
Foreign employers operating U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries
should not be able to use FCEs to mask national origin or other forms
of employment discrimination that are deemed unlawfil under United
States law. The scope of the right to employ one's own citizens under
FCN treaties must be carefully delineated so that employment prac-
tices of domestically incorporated subsidiaries do not unnecessarily
trammel the equal employment rights of United States nationals. This
is particularly true in light of the accommodating nature of United
States equal employment statutes, which specifically defer to the law
of a host foreign country when laws conflict. If no conflict existed,
United States law would govern the rights of United States citizens
employed extraterritorially by U.S.-controlled businesses.2
This Article focuses on employment practices in the United
States where the exercise of FCE rights collides with Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. How broad the discretion to select employ-
ees under FCEs is, or should be, will remain a matter of some debate
2. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Cov-
erage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC Notice No. 915. 002 (Oct. 20, 1993), 203 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) D-01, D-11 (Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance],
Under Section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII only protects United States
citizens employed by United States companies operating abroad if such protection does
not violate the law of the host country. Even in this regard, the United States takes im-
plicit notice of the long-held concept that the country where a person is employed has a
special interest in the terms and conditions of the employment carried on therein. It seems
a reciprocal expectation that foreign employers operating in the United States should
abide by equal employment opportunity principles embodied in our federal law, absent
clear immunity under FCN treaty. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp.V 1993).
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pending explicit clarification by the Supreme Court or Congress. In
the interim, this Article reviews the weight of FCN treaties relative to
federal statutes, as well as judicial precedent, much of which focuses
on the U.S.-Japan FCN treaty,3 and the recent Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's enforcement guidance on this topic.4 Ulti-
mately, an interpretation of FCEs that reconciles the important pur-
poses underlying both FCN treaties and United States equal
employment opportunity laws is recommended.
I. THE BALANCE BETWEEN FCN TREATIES AND
TITLE VII
A. The Purposes of FCN Treaties and Tide VII
The FCN treaties under consideration here are commercial
agreements between countries that were designed to encourage inter-
national investment after World War II. They are primarily invest-
ment treaties that seek to create a favorable climate for foreign
investors,5 as well as provide for "equality of treatment as between the
alien and the citizen of the country."'6 FCN treaties are "fundamen-
tally economic and legal," as distinguished from political in nature.7
They are "concerned with the protection of persons... and property,"
having an objective of securing "nondiscrimination, or equality of
treatment."8' They set out ground rules for mutual respect between
nations and their reciprocal interests abroad.
With respect to employment, FCN treaties typically contain a
provision, known as a free choice exemption (FCE) clause, which al-
lows the foreign-owned subsidiary to choose its own "accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
3. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070. Article
VIII, paragraph 1 provides: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to
engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." See infra
notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing Sumitomo).
4. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-1.
5. Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign In-
vestment" Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. CoMp. L 229, 244 (1956).
6. Id. at 232.
7. Herman Walker, Jr., Modem Treaties of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, 42
MINN. L. REv. 805, 806 (1958).
8. Id. at 806, 811. There are two principal standards of treatment: national treatment,
and most favored nation treatment. Id. at 811. The latter assures nondiscrimination as
compared with other aliens. IaL The former, which affords greater protections, assures
nondiscrimination as compared with foreign nationals and domestic citizens. Id.
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other specialists," to work in the host country.9 The United States
insisted upon such FCE clauses in order to ensure that American-
owned or controlled companies operating abroad would not be forced
to hire certain percentages of host country citizens pursuant to local
laws. These provisions reciprocally provide a grant of immunity to
foreign-owned or controlled companies operating within the United
States to select citizens of the foreign country to operate their U.S.-
based facilities.
Foreign-owned companies seek a broad interpretation of FCE
clauses, which would allow them to engage in employment practices
with these specialist employees without interference from the antidis-
crimination laws of the host country (the United States). On the other
hand, domestic employees seek a more restrictive reading such that
employment practices will be subject to the host country's laws even
for these specialist personnel. Courts are called upon to construe the
meaning of FCE clauses despite the lack of negotiatiag or legislative
history available, and the fact that a uniform or model treaty does not
exist. Although many of the FCN treaties "show close kinship,... no
two of them of course are identical." 10 One treaty that is referred to
when construing the history of FCEs is the U.S.-Uruguay Treaty
which provides that employers may choose the specialist employees
"of their choice... regardless of nationality."" Typically, treaties do
not have the emphatic language "regardless of nationality" written
into the FCE clauses.' 2 It is clear that the Uruguay treaty allows for
discrimination on the basis of citizenship and even national origin
(without specifically providing similar exemptions for age, sex, race,
color, or religion). Thus, while some treaties, such as the Uruguay
version, allow for discrimination beyond citizenship to include na-
tional origin, treaties without national origin'language should be con-
strued narrowly to limit the citizenship preference to just that, and
disallow discrimination on the basis of national origin.
9. Herman Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Trea-
ties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 386 n.62 (1956). A similar provision was first included in the
treaty from Uruguay. Id. This type of clause seeks to avoid the imposition of host country
"ultranationalistic policies" on foreign-owned companies. Id. at 386.
10. Walker, supra note 7, at 807.
11. leaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic Development, Nov. 23,1949, U.S.-
Uruguay, Art. V, sec. 4, reprinted in 96 Cong. Rec. 12082, 12083 (1950).
12. See Eric Grasberger, Note, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to
Foreign Employer Job Discrimination Under FCN Treaty Rights, 16 N.C. J. INr'L L. &
COM. REG., 141, 155-56 (1991).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eradicate
discriminatory employment practices based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) is the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title
VII and other equal employment opportunity laws.13 The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 amended Title VII in several respects. Most notably it
clarified a plaintiff's burden of proof regarding claims of disparate
treatment or disparate impact employment discrimination, 4 and codi-
fied Title VII's applicability to U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S.-
owned or controlled businesses, albeit with the proviso that should
United States and foreign law conflict regarding the legality of an em-
ployment practice, foreign law would control.'5
In terms of Title VII's intersection with FCN treaties, and FCEs
in particular, two primary legal issues merit discussion. Fist, should
FCN treaties or Title VII take precedence in the event of a complete
conflict between the two? Second, should citizenship preferences
(protected under FCEs) be equated with national origin discrimina-
tion (actionable under Title VII) where the effect of these preferences
would amount to national origin discrimination?
The authority of FCN treaties is equivalent to federal law since
each is deemed supreme law of the United States.' 6 Critical to inter-
preting the intent of the treaties and Title VII is the clear language of
their legislative histories with regard to national origin discrimination,
which unfortunately is minimal. Most FCN treaties were enacted
prior to Title VII, and the statute's legislative history does not refer to
FCN treaties.17 Pursuant to principles of international comity, the
laws of a host country generally govern treatment of an alien corpora-
tion.18 Locally-incorporated subsidiaries should also conform to the
host's laws, although as outlined in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, discussed below, the Supreme Court left unanswered the
question of whether a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary could assert its
foreign parent's FCN treaty rights.19 When interpreting two laws of
equal status, courts assiduously seek to avoid conflict between the
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(4)-2000(e)(5) (1988 & Supp.V 1993).
14. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (Supp.V 1993).
15. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-6.
16. John Scaccia, Title VII and Treaty Rights Battles: Te Verdict Is Still Out, 10 Ass'WN
STUDENT IN'L L. SocEmTs INTr'L L. J. 77, 83 (1986).
17. Id. at 83.
18. Id. at 88.
19. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing Sumitomo).
1995]
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two, and are reluctant to imply repeal of the former (FCN treaties)
due to the enactment of the latter (Title VII).20
FCN treaties were not intended to give foreign-owned companies
greater rights than domestically-owned companies. Rather, they were
intended to provide a level playing field, with similar privileges and
responsibilities as a domestic company.21 The threshold interpreta-
tion of how the two laws interrelate is set forth below in the Sumitomo
discussion. 2 In general, courts are reluctant to perceive a conflict
between the two laws and prefer to construe each law narrowly in
order to render each valid.
B. Distinguishing Citizenship and National Origin
Discrimination
As far as the definition of the protection from national origin dis-
crimination afforded by Title VII is concerned, the determinative pre-
cedent is Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.23 Espinoza involved a
United States company that rejected an applicant for employment on
the basis that she was not a United States citizen.24 Persons of Mexi-
can ancestry made up more than 96% of the employees at the com-
pany's San Antonio division-all of whom met the company's
citizenship requirement.25 Thus, Farah's requirement of U.S. citizen-
ship for employees did not create a disparate impact based on national
origin or ancestry with respect to Espinoza, who was a citizen of Mex-
ico and of Mexican ancestry.26
The Court in Espinoza emphasized that Title VII',; legislative his-
tory regarding the term "national origin" indicated that the phrase
was intended to refer to the country of the individuad or his or her
forebears.27 The national origin protection afforded by the statute,
therefore, does not extend to a prohibition on a citizenship require-
ment for employment, a threshold utilized by the federal government
20. See Scaccia, supra note 16, at 89.
21. Id. at 78; Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188 n.18 (discussing national treatment); cf. Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley, J., dissenting) vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
22. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing Sumitomo).
23. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
24. Id. at 87-88. Mrs. Espinoza, who was a citizen of Mexico, was a lawful resident of
the U.S. Id. at 87.
25. Id. at 93.
26. Id. at 87, 93.
27. Id. at 88-89.
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itself. Nonetheless, the Espinoza Court noted that a citizenship test
might serve as "a pretext to disguise... national-origin discrimina-
tion."29 Relying upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Espinoza
Court stated that "[c]ertainly Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin."31 Yet, in its holding, the Espi-
noza Court found that "nothing in [Title VII] makes it illegal to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."' 3 Meanwhile the
Court included legal resident aliens amongst those individuals pro-
tected by Title VII, rather than limiting such protection only to citi-
zens.33 So even a permanent resident is entitled to invoke his or her
rights under Title VII and may successfully seek redress for a claim of
discrimination based upon national origin where a neutral require-
ment such as citizenship has "the purpose or effect" of discriminating
on the basis of national origin.
While noncitizens employed in the United States enjoy Title VII
protection from discrimination on the basis of their national origin,
United States nationals may receive only limited protection under Ti-
tle VII due to FCEs when they compete for jobs in, or are employed
by, foreign MNEs that are protected by an FCN treaty. Just as nonci-
tizens of the United States could state a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted if they were discriminated against on numer-
ous protected bases, excluding citizenship (unless the citizenship re-
quirement had the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin), U.S. nationals should also be protected under Title
VII while employed within the United States by an FCN-privileged
foreign MNE, except in limited circumstances where: 1) the position
in question truly fits the FCE language and the intent of the parties to
the FCN treaty; and 2) the treaty privilege is narrowly interpreted to
permit free choice in order to protect the foreign employer's invest-
ment, but does not amount to the transport of patent cultural biases.
28. Id at 89-90.
29. Id at 92.
30. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Congress reinforced the holding of Griggs regarding
nonintentional or disparate impact discrimination when it passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
31. 414 U.S. at 92.
32. Id at 95. A reason why 'itle VII was not deemed to prevent discrimination on the
basis of citizenship was that Congress deleted the word "ancestry" from the final version of
the statute, which the Court felt indicated that the terms "national origin" and "ancestry"
were synonymous. Id at 89.
33. Id at 95.
34. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92, 95.
1995]
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Discrimination in violation of public policies that are deeply embed-
ded in United States law should not be permitted to flourish pursuant
to a broad interpretation of FCEs.35
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The United States Supreme Court: The Sumitomo Case Creates
a Starting Point
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, the Supreme
Court unanimously expressed the view that a corporation based and
incorporated within the United States is subject to the requirements
of Title VII even though the corporation is a wholiy-owned subsidiary
of a Japanese general trading company3 6 The plaintiffs, secretarial
employees of a New York corporation, alleged, inter alia, that respon-
dents violated Title VII by hiring only male Japanese citizens for exec-
utive, managerial, and sales positions.37 In defense, respondents
asserted that their employment practices were exempt from Title VII
scrutiny because, under Article VIII (1) of the FCN Treaty between
the United States and Japan, "companies of either Party ... [may]
engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice.",38 Companies are defined under
Treaty Article XXII(3) as "[c]ompanies constituted under the applica-
ble laws and regulations within the territories of either Party. ' 39 This
Article VIII(1) FCE clause defense rested upon the premise that
Sumitomo was a Japanese company and thus, could assert the U.S.-
Japan FCN treaty rights, but the Court disagreed, holding that
Sumitomo was instead a United States company.40 Thus, the rights
under Article VIII(1) were not applicable because such rights were
available only to Japanese companies operating in the United States. 41
35. See generally MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135,1143 (3rd Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
36. 457 U.S. 176.
37. Id. at 178.
38. Id. at 181. Interestingly, Japan sought to delete Article VIII (1) from the treaty
but the United States insisted on the provision in order "to avoid strict percentile limita-
tions on employment of Americans abroad and 'to prevent the imposition of ultranational-
istic policies"' regarding essential personnel. Id at 181 n.6 (quoting Herman Walker, Jr.,
supra note 7, at 386).
39. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182.
40. Id. This holding was based upon the company's place of incorporation, the state of
New York. Id.
41. Id. at 183.
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For a foreign company to successfully invoke the FCN treaty exemp-
tion protections, the Court held that the company must be from a for-
eign country.
Both the United States and Japanese governments supported this
interpretation of the FCN Treaty,42 an interpretation which essentially
permits the location of incorporation to determine national identity
for the purpose of invoking the rights provided in Article VIII(1).
This reading follows from a literal construction of the legal locus of a
business, and from the plain language and purpose of the Treaty. The
intent of the Treaty was not to grant greater rights to foreign corpora-
tions than to domestic ones. It was merely "to assure them the right
to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination
based on their alienage."4 3 Thus, the entitlement granted foreign cor-
porations was termed "national treatment" which meant terms "no
less favorable" than those afforded to host-country corporations. This
"national treatment" is deemed "first-class" and to be preferred even
to "most-favored-nation treatment" which the Court considered less
advantageous.44
The Supreme Court addressed the legal ramifications of the dif-
ferences between Japanese companies operating branch offices di-
rectly in the United States, and U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries of
Japanese companies. The Court noted that subsidiaries, "as compa-
nies of the United States, would enjoy all of those [rights of Japanese
companies operating directly in the United States] and more. The
only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that
conferred by Article VIII(l). '45 Most significantly, the Court set out
in a footnote that it expressed "no view as to whether Japanese citi-
zenship may be a bona fide occupational qualification for certain posi-
tions or as to whether a business necessity defense may be available"
since these questions were not placed before the Courl 46 The Court
also refused to determine whether Sumitomo could assert its parent
corporation's FCN treaty rights under Article VI(1).47
42. Id.
43. Id. at 188.
44. Id. at 188 n.18. See Madeline C. Amendola, Note, American Citizens as Second
Class Employees: The Permissible Discrimination, 5 CONN. . ImT'L L. 651, 654 (1990).
45. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
46. Id. at 189 n.19.
47. Id. It is noteworthy that if Sumitomo was to assert its parent's FCN treaty rights,
then it would be based on the parent corporation's control of the labor relations matters of
the locally incorporated subsidiary. This should mean that liability for labor relations mat-
ters should also flow beyond the assets of the subsidiary. See generally Eileen M. Mullen,
1995]
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B. The Circuit Courts of Appeal and Federal District Courts
Thus far, five circuit courts of appeal have ruled on the relation-
ship between FCN treaties and Title VII.1 Additionally, district
courts within these circuits have construed the balance between the
two laws.49 The case discussion that follows begins with the Second
Circuit and then proceeds to the Seventh Circuit, whose approach
provides the greatest contrast to the Second Circuit. Thereafter, opin-
ions from the Fifth, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits are addressed.
1. The Second Circuit
a. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.50
Female secretarial employees brought suit against Sumitomo, a
U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, claiming
that its practice of hiring only male Japanese nationals for manage-
ment positions discriminated against the plaintiffs in violation of Title
Vll.51 Sumitomo sought to dismiss the suit on grounds that the FCN
Treaty exempted Japanese trading companies and their wholly-owned
subsidiaries from Title VII.52  The Second Circuit considered
"whether the freedom-of-choice language of Article VIII of the Treaty
exempts Sumitomo from Title VHI... as far as executive personnel
are concerned.15 3  Concluding that the language did not exempt
Sumitomo, the court reviewed the Treaty's history and found that it
failed to support the "expansive interpretation" offered by
Sumitomo.4
Note, Rotating Japanese Managers in American Subsidiaries of Japanese Firms: A Chal-
lenge for American Employment Discrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. IR.v. 725, 760 (1993)
(discussing loss of limited liability as a disadvantage of parent corporation's admission of
control over policies of the subsidiary).
48. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara, 863 F. 2d 1135;
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F. 2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984); Spiess, 643 F.2d 353; Avagliano
v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F. 2d 552 (2nd Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
49. Papaila v. Uniden America Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Goyette V.
DCA Advertising, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1993); Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd.,
685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 29 Empl. Prac, Dec.
(CCH) 32, 903, at 26, 278 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1981); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.,
470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
50. 638 F.2d 552 (2nd Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176
(1982).
51. Avagliano, 638 F.2d at 553.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 558. The court initially found Sumitomo had standing to assert its parent's
treaty rights. Id, at 555-57.
54. Id at 558-59.
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The court set forth an analysis for the disposition of this issue
whereby it subjected the foreign-owned company to Title VII, but al-
lowed the company to present a modified bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) defense to explain why it had to employ its own
nationals.55 Noting that the BFOQ is normally a narrowly construed
defense, the court gave a considerable degree of deference to the FCN
Treaty and construed the defense:
in a manner that will give due weight to the Treaty rights and unique
requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United
States, including such factors as a person's (1) Japanese linguistic
and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets,
customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel
and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and (4)
acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch
does business.5 6
Recognizing the high correlation of national origin and citizen-
ship in this instance, the court refused to immunize the company from
Title VIrs ban on discrimination even with regard to employment of
its executive personnel (despite the presence of an FCE clause). The
Second Circuit, however, offered the company relief to the extent that
the court required only "some evidence of BFOQ status" to success-
fully defend a discrimination charge, rather than the more exacting
proof of BFOQ status normally required of domestic employers.P
Thus, under certain conditions, "Japanese citizenship could be a bona
fide occupational qualification for high level employment with a Japa-
nese-owned domestic corporation and... Sumitomo's practices might
thus fit within a statutory exception to Title VII.58
55. Id- at 559; cf. Goyette, 830 F. Supp. at 749.
56. Avagliano, 638 F.2d at 559.
57. Id. But see Fortino, 950 F.2d 389 (discrimination on basis of citizenship not action-
able under Title VHI); Spiess, 643 F.2d 353,362-63 (company covered by treaty and discrim-
ination on basis of citizenship permitted under treaty since citizenship not a protected
category under Title VII).
58. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 179-80. The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the
Second Circuit's opinion regarding whether Sumitomo is a company of Japan. The Court
held that it was not a company of Japan, and thus not covered by Article VIII (1) of the
Treaty. Id. at 189-190,190 n.19. But cf. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393 (U.S. subsidiary of foreign
parent covered by Article VfIl(l) of Treaty where parent dictated subsidiary's discrimina-
tory conduct). Id.
1995]
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b. Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc.9
In this recent case controlled by Second Circuit precedent, the
plaintiffs, former employees of DCA, filed suit against the company, a
U.S.-incorporated subsidiary, and Dentsu, its Japanese parent com-
pany.60 The defendants asserted that they were not liable under Title
VII because the FCN treaty allows it to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship.61 The court first found that there was jurisdiction over
the foreign parent company and that it was an employer for purposes
of Title VII. The court then stated that an FCN Treaty does not give
the parent company the right to discriminate on the basis of national
origin. "A Japanese corporation doing business in the United States
can only hire according to national origin if the company can show
that national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification." 62
Under the framework established by the Second Circuit, the defend-
ant was not exempted from Title VII, and in order to prevail, the com-
pany must demonstrate that national origin is a BFOQ under the
Avagliano BFOQ standard for foreign companies.
The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the Title VII claim, finding no proof that national origin
was a BFOQ for the jobs.63 Thus, neither the subsidiary nor the par-
ent company is automatically shielded by the FCN Treaty against
charges brought under Title VII.
c. Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc."4
Linskey commenced this action pursuant to Title VII alleging that
he was discharged because he was not a Danish citizen.65 The em-
ployer was a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign business incorporated under
the laws of the Republic of Denmark. 6  The court first considered
whether the parent corporation was an employer of the plaintiff and
could be held responsible for the practices of its subsidiary. Reason-
ing that Title VII is remedial in nature and should be granted a liberal
59. 830 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
60. Goyette, 830 F. Supp. at 740-41.
61. Id. at 749.
62. Id.
63. Id. See generally Deborah Pines, U. S. Employees Allowed to Sue Japanese Com-
pany for Job Bias, N.Y. L., Aug. 10, 1993, at 1.
64. 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1182.
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interpretation, the court held that the subsidiary and the parent may
be regarded as "one entity for the purposes of this action." 67
Second, the court considered the then novel question of whether
the U.S.-Denmark FCN Treaty exempts a parent company from Title
VII.68 The court denied the parent company's motion to dismiss the
action, concluding that there is no "absolute privilege to hire profes-
sional and other specialized employees of their choice irrespective of
the American laws prohibiting employment discrimination. ' 69 Draw-
ing support for this proposition from the legislative histories of several
FCNs, the court reasoned that a "different ruling would provide an
unjustified loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of
Title VII.1170 Interestingly, however, the court never discussed the fact
that citizenship is not a protected category under Title VII, but seems
to have assumed citizenship and national origin are the same. Avag-
liano, the controlling precedent in the Second Circuit, is an extension
of the reasoning in Linskey.
2. The Seventh Circuit
a. Fortino v. Quasar Company7 '
The Seventh Circuit became the first court to specifically address
the question of whether a U.S. corporation may assert the Article
VIII(1) rights of its parent, a foreign corporation.7 In this case, for-
mer managers brought suit against Quasar, a U.S.-incorporated sub-
sidiary of Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company. The court
considered "whether a claim of discrimination on the basis of national
origin is tenable when, as in this case, the discrimination is in favor of
foreign citizens employed temporarily in the United States in accord-
ance with a treaty between the United States and Japan that entitles
companies of each nation to employ executives of their own choice in
the other one."'73 The court ruled that discrimination in favor of Japa-
nese citizens, pursuant to an express FCN treaty right, does not violate
Title VI's ban on national origin discrimination. 74
67. Id. at 1183.
68. Id. at 1184-85.
69. Id. at 1185.
70. Id. at 1185-87.
71. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 392-93; cf. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-8, D-9.
73. 950 F.2d at 391.
74. Id. at 392-93. See generally David T. Wilson, Note, Foreign Owned Subsidiaries
and National Origin Discrimination: Can Federal Employment Discrimination Law and
Employer Choice Provisions be Reconciled?, 10 ARz I. IN"L & Coi. .L 507, 535-36
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Since Title VII does not ban discrimination on the basis of citi-
zenship and the FCN treaty explicitly allows this, the Seventh Circuit
declined to find an actionable Title VII claim.75 "This collision [be-
tween the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty and Title VII] is avoided by holding
national origin and citizenship separate. '76 In an effort to foreclose
further speculation, the court stated that its conclusion would be true
whether the allegations are for intentional discrimination or for dispa-
rate impact discrimination.77 Even while conceding that because of
Japan's homogeneity a disparate impact suit was conceivable, the
court remained unwilling to allow that type of suit since the "exercise
of a treaty right [to prefer one's own citizens] may not be made the
basis for inferring a violation of Title VII."'7
After passing on the merits, the court next considered whether
"Quasar, not being a Japanese company in the technical sense ...
[may] rely on the treaty. . .. ,79 Earlier, Sumitomo had held that a
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent was not protected by the FCN
treaty, but specifically declined to decide whether a subsidiary might
assert its parent's treaty rights to the extent that the parent had dic-
tated the discriminatory practices.8 0 Finding that Quasar's parent
company, Matsushita, exerted a relatively high level of control over
the subsidiary, the court allowed Quasar to assert Matsushita's treaty
rights granting them the right to favor their Japanese citizens.8" This,
of course, is a neat and tidy literal construction of the 'Reaty and Title
VII so as to render both valid.82 Yet it has the impact and effect of
causing the Title VII ban on national origin discrimination to be illu-
sory. While Fortino addressed the reality that in Japan, in stark con-
trast to the United States, citizenship and national origin are highly
correlated and in unison, the decision splits the concepts to reconcile
the demands of Title VII and the U.S.-Japan FCN treaty.83 While the
(1993); Thomas J. Piskorski, Fortino v. Quasar Co.: Are Japanese-Owned Companies Im-
mune from Title VII?, 18 EMPL RE. L.J. 61, 67-68 (1992).
75. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
76. Id, at 393.
77. Id. at 392-93; cf. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
78. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
79. Id.
80. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 n.19.
81. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393. The court rationalized this result "at least to the extent
necessary to prevent the treaty from being set at naught." Id.
82. Id. The court thus avoided what it characterized as a "collision." Id.
83. Id. at 392-93. "of course, especially in the case of a homogenous country like
Japan, citizenship and national origin are highly correlated; almost all citizens of Japan
were born there." Id. at 392.
[Vol. 18:531
The Conflict Between Title VII and FCN Reaties
Seventh Circuit's reasoning is technically correct according to a
straight and rigorous reading of the two laws, it creates an unfortunate
precedent that has a discriminatory impact undermining Title VII.
Under Fortino, a foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese
company may fire with impunity U.S. nationals and replace them with
Japanese nationals or those of Japanese ethnic origin who are also Jap-
anese citizens. It very much looks like what the Espinoza Court re-
ferred to as "a pretext to disguise what is in fact national-origin
discrimination."'
b. Porto v. Canon, Inc.8s
William L. Porto filed this action against Canon, a U.S.-incorpo-
rated subsidiary of a Japanese company, alleging that Canon estab-
lished systems which limited the employment opportunities of non-
Japanese origin employees. s6 Canon asserted that "Title VII is inap-
plicable because it has been superseded by the Treaty."' s Since there
was no controlling Seventh Circuit precedent at the time, the court
looked to the Second Circuit (Avagliano) and the Fifth Circuit
(Spiess).8s Concluding that compliance with Title VII is consistent
with the language and purpose of the FCN treaty, the court rejected
Canon's "broad interpretation" of the FCE clauseP9
The court cautioned, however, that if a defendant is illegally dis-
criminating in favor of persons of Japanese national origin who are
not Japanese citizens, [such as a person born in the United States
whose parents were originally from Japan] a cause of action under
Title VII may be stated. However, if defendant is discriminating
only in favor of Japanese citizens, and not in favor of persons of
Japanese national origin, it is doubtful that a cause of action is
stated under Title VII. 90
This was a harbinger for the outcome in Fortino.
84. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92.
85. Porto, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCII) 32, 903, at 26, 278.
86. Id. at 26, 278.
87. Id at 26, 279.
88. Id. at 26, 282.
89. Id at 26, 282-83.
90. Id at 26, 283.
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3. The Fifth Circuit
a. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.91
Itoh, a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary wholly owned by a Japanese
company, allegedly discriminated against its American employees by
making managerial promotions and other benefits available only to
Japanese citizens.92 Itoh asserted that the FCN treaty and FCE
clause "cloaks the company with absolute immunity from American
employment discrimination laws as to these positions. '93 The court
first found that Itoh had standing to assert its parent's treaty rights.14
As to the scope of the rights established by the Treaty, the court held
that Itoh had a "limited right to discriminate in favor of Japanese na-
tionals in filling [managerial and technical] positions." 95 Rejecting the
Second Circuit's approach, the court wrote: "[t]o make this right [to
choose essential personnel] subject to Title VII's 'bfoq' requirements
... would render.., the Treaty virtually meaningless." 96 The court
even suggested that all employment practices relating to executive
personnel should be completely immune from U.S. antidiscrimination
laws, stating that "[c]ompanies have a right to decide which executives
and technicians will manage their investment in the host country,
without regard to host country laws."'
The only dissent in this line of cases was written ia Spiess. Judge
Reavley noted that a company has the nationality of its place of incor-
poration, and thus, Itoh was a U.S. company.98 The company is then
responsible for complying with all U.S. laws. Judge Reavley would
not have allowed Itoh to assert its foreign parent's treaty rights and
thus avoid its responsibility to comply with Title VII.519 "If Japanese
investors ... gain all the benefits of our legal system on a basis equal
with American corporations, I find it eminently reasonable that they
91. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other' grounds, 457 U.S.
1128 (1982).
92. Id. at 355.
93. Id. This absolute immunity Itoh sought would even have incltded immunity from
discrimination on the basis of age, race, sex, religion, national origin, and color.
94. Id. at 357-58; see also Avagliano, 638 F2d at 555-57. The Supreme Court re-
manded Spiess in light of its holding in Sumitomo. See Spiess, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
95. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 355. The Fifth Circuit based its decision an its reading of the
Treaty's negotiating history in the context of post-World War II polices. Id. at 359.63.
96. Id. at 362.
97. Id. at 361.
98. Id. at 363 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
99. Id, at 363-67.
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accept legal responsibilities and duties on an equal basis as well."10
Judge Reavley's approach is direct and makes the law easy to apply.
It has great predictive value in this sense. Such an approach, however,
creates an uneven business environment especially at a time when
companies are considering investing in countries which offer more
protections than U.S. laws.
b. Papaila v. Uniden America Corp.10 1
This is the most recent case construing Title VII and an FCN
treaty's FCE clause. A former employee of a U.S.-incorporated sub-
sidiary of a Japanese corporation brought a Title VII suit for breach of
an employment contract and employment discrimination." 2 Agreeing
with Fortino that a subsidiary may assert the treaty rights of its parent,
the court followed the Spiess and Fortino precedents in upholding the
exercise of rights under an FCN treaty to choose citizens of the parent
company's own nation for certain positions.0 3 Recognizing the dis-
tinction between citizenship and national origin, the court found no
evidence that any of Uniden's employees of Japanese origin who were
not Japanese citizens were in any way favored. The court noted, how-
ever, that Uniden does not have license to discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin.'01
4. The Third Circuit
a. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines0 5
Korean Air Lines (KAL) discharged six American managers and
replaced them with four Korean citizens (who were Korean nationals
as well), ostensibly as part of a reorganization. 1 6 MacNamara filed
suit alleging that his discharge violated, inter alia, Title VI.L1 7 KAL
asserted that its practices were privileged under the terms of the U.S.-
100. Id at 369.
101. 840 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
102. Id. at 443.
103. Id. at 447.
104. Id. at 446-47. See generally, Federal Judge Upholds Subsidiary's Right To Discrimi-
nate in Favor of Japanese Citizens, BNA DAELY LAB. REP., Feb. 3, 1994, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File.
105. 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
106. Id. at 1137-38. The court held that the employment practices in question were
within the protection of Article VIII(1) because the reassignment of job responsibilities
involved "engaging" executives of the company's choice as per the language of the FCE
clause. Id. at 1142.
107. Id. at 1138.
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Korea FCN Treaty.10 8 The Third Circuit first found that KAL was
covered by the Treaty, and thus could invoke the Article VIII(l) FCE
clause."° One important fact that distinguishes this case from Fortino
is that KAL was not a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary; it was a branch of
the foreign parent, and was clearly entitled to exercise the 'reaty's
FCE rights. Like the later Seventh Circuit decision in Fortino, the
MacNamara court perceived no theoretical conflict between Title
VII's prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin, and the Treaty's right to select managers solely on the
basis of their citizenship. 110
The MacNamara court delved further and considered whether a
potential conflict exists between the exercise of treaty rights and Title
VII where a disparate impact could be established. Disparate impact
occurs when an employment practice is neutral on its face but works
an invidious impact."' Thus, even while attempting to render both
laws valid, the court recognized a potential partial conflict between
them with regard to disparate impact discrimination.
To establish such liability, parties generally rely on statistical evi-
dence of the disproportionate effect of a facially neutral practice or
job requirement. In cases where a company requires its employees to
be citizens of a country whose population happens to be racially ho-
mogenous, national origin and citizenship are highly correlated and
statistical evidence of a disproportionate effect on U.S. nationals "is
likely to be substantial," indicating a Title VII violation."2  Thus "a
disparate impact case can result in liability where the employer did
nothing more than exercise" its Treaty rights governing selection of
personnel." 3 Concluding that disparate impact liability definitely
conflicts with Article VIII(1) of the Treaty, the Third Circuit deferred
to international law principles and held that Title VII hlability may not
be imposed. 1 4 Thus, MacNamara could proceed with his claims of
108. ME KAL filed a motion to dismiss the suit accordingly. Ii.
109. Id. at 1140.
110. Id. at 1140-41, 1146-47, 1147 n.14 (emphasis added). The court was critical of the
Second Circuit's approach to this issue. Id.
111. Id. at 1141. See generally Grasberger, supra note 12, at 141-145; Espinoza, 414
U.S. at 92. The MacNamara court thereby recognized national origin discrimination as
prohibited by Title VII, and citizenship discrimination as permitted by the Treaty as sepa-
rate and distinct phenomena. 863 F.2d at 1145-46. The court found there was no conflict
between the laws in mixed-motive cases. Id. at 1147 n.15.
112. Id. at 1148.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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disparate treatment, but liability based upon disparate impact could
not be imposed."
5. The Sixth Circuit
a. Wickes v. Olympic Airways" 6
The plaintiff filed suit under state law alleging that Olympic, a
foreign corporation, discriminated against him on the basis of his age
and national origin.117 The court noted that the legislative history of
the U.S.-Greek FCN Treaty contained evidence that it was "intended
to be a narrow privilege to employ Greek citizens for certain high
level positions, not a wholesale immunity from compliance with labor
laws. ... "I In the instant case, the court found that while
"[c]itizenship per se is not a classification" in the state anti-discrimina-
tion laws, "[t]o the extent that plaintiff may claim on remand that
Greek citizenship and national origin are synonymous... such a claim
would conflict with the Treaty and the Treaty would prevail [over the
state law]."119
The court recognized that the "[t]reaty provides Greek compa-
nies doing business in the United States, and American companies in
Greece some freedom to favor their own citizens for managerial and
technical positions within the company so as to ensure their opera-
tional success." 0 National origin discrimination was found to be dis-
tinct from discrimination based upon citizenship."'
6. The Eleventh Circuit
a. Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd."z
Ward brought suit against Voortman, a foreign corporation with a
principal place of business in Canada, alleging workplace sex discrimi-
nation.Im Without acknowledging any cases directly on point, the fed-
115. Id. The court reversed the summary judgment for KAL, and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Id. at 1149. The disparate treatment charge was most likely dis-
missed as the appeals court made clear its position that there is no "theoretical or prag-
matic" inconsistency between recognizing Title VII rights along with Article VIII(1) rights.
Id. at 1148.
116. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 364-65.
118. Id. at 365.
119. Id. at 368; cf. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
120. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368; cf. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
121. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368; cf. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
122. 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
123. Id. at 231.
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eral district court concluded that "any company, foreign or domestic,
that elects to do business in this country falls within Title VII's reach
and should, and must, do business here according to its rules prohibit-
ing discrimination." 124  The court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would be contrary to Title VI's expansive goal, and it would be "illog-
ical" to limit its reach to American employees working for domestic
entities and to leave "open for victimization" American employees of
foreign-owned businesses.12 5 This is perhaps the strongest judicial
language recognizing the inconsistent exemption of foreign-owned
businesses from Title VII liability. Since no FCN treaty was men-
tioned in the case, it may be fair to speculate that this result was
reached because there was no treaty or FCE clause.
In sum, courts have taken various approaches in deciding
whether U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries may assert their foreign par-
ents' treaty rights, and whether the scope of such rights should extend
to exempting these United States subsidiaries from U.S. antidis-
crimination laws.
At this point in time, the ultimate result of this conflict is that not
all companies are playing by the same rules, and this handicaps those
companies who must comply with the most stringent antidiscrimina-
tion laws. This outcome was surely not intended, nor does it promote
comity and consistency in the global marketplace. A clarifying deci-
sion from the Supreme Court is necessary in order to unify the circuit
courts of appeal. In the interim, it is of considerable interest to look
at the EEOC's guidance on this topic.
IV. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
STATEMENT
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's most recent
guidance on the topic of discrimination by foreign employers within
the United States sets forth the agency's position regarding the cover-
age of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to
foreign employers who are discriminating within the United States. 126
The EEOC outlines the judicial interpretation of the interrelationship
of equal employment opportunity statutes with the immunity pro-
124. Id. at 233.
125. Id at 232. The court thus denied Voortman's motion to dismis the discrimination
charges. Id. at 233.
126. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-1 to D-13.
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vided by FCEs. It also updates the 1988 EEOC Policy Guidance on
Title VII Charges Against Foreign Companies and U.S. Employers
Overseas, in light of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the ADA. 2 7 This recent guidance more explicitly details the assess-
ment of the nationality of employers2 s and provides an updated
framework for reconciling the conflict of FCN treaties with Title
VI].129
The EEOC uses a straightforward approach in determining the
nationality of an employer for the purposes of determining Title VII
coverage. 130 The Commission first looks to the place of incorporation
to establish nationality.'' In some instances, however, the totality of
a company's contacts with the United States must be evaluated.'
The factors specifically deemed relevant by the EEOC to determine
the nationality of business entities include:
(a) the company's principal place of business, i.e., the place where
primary factories, offices, or other facilities are located; (b) the na-
tionality of dominant shareholders and/or those holding voting con-
trol; and (c) the nationality and location of management, i.e., of the
officers and directors of the company. 33
Even where an entity's nationality is determined by the Commis-
sion not to be American, the employer should be covered by Title VII
if its conduct abroad is "controlled" by an American employer.134
127. EEOC Policy Guidance on Title VII Charges Against Foreign Companies and U.S.
Employers Overseas, 183 DAmy LAB. REP. (BNA) D-I (Sept. 2, 1988) [hereinafter 1988
Policy Guidance]. The 1988 Policy Guidance deferred the questions that were raised, but
not answered, in Sumitomo to the Title VII/EPA Division, Office of Legal Counsel, thus
limiting that guidance to Title VII's coverage of a foreign corporation as an employer
under Title VII. Id. at D-5. The 1988 Policy Guidance also dealt with the application of
Title VII to U.S. employers abroad which was substantially revised in the 1993 EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, but this is outside the scope of this article.
128. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-5.
129. Id. at D-7 to D-11. This guidance directs internal personnel when processing
charges.
130. Id. at D-5.
131. Id. (citing R.STATEEmrr (Thsnn) OF THE FoREioN Rms. ToNs LAW OF TmE
UNrnTD STATES 213 (1987)).
132. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-5.
133. Id.
134. Here the Commission uses four factors discussed in Section 109 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to assess control: (a) interrelation of operations; (b) common management; (c)
centralized control of labor relations; and (d) common ownership or financial control of
the employer and the foreign corporation. These factors are traditional determinants of
integrated enterprises or a single employer, originally developed by the National Labor
Relations Board but subsequently utilized in Title VII and other employment discrimina-
tion cases. See Nobuhisa Ishizuka, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation
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The EEOC has determined that both Title VII and the ADA apply to
foreign employers when the discrimination occurs in the United
States.135 This threshold jurisdictional matter follows from the elec-
tion to do business and employ individuals within the United States,
which subjects foreign employers to United States employment an-
tidiscrimination laws, while it simultaneously entitles them to the
"benefits and protections of U.S. law."'1 36 The Commission also out-
lines the appropriate analysis to apply when a foreign employer as-
serts that an FCN treaty limits the applicability of Title VII to its
employment practices. 137
When analyzing whether a respondent foreign employer is pro-
tected by a treaty which permits preference for citizens of that em-
ployer's nation, the EEOC considers: 1) whether the offending
employer is actually covered by a relevant treaty or agreement; 2)
whether the employment practices in question are sheltered by the
treaty; and if they are, 3) what impact the treaty has upon Title VII
rights.'38 The Commission looks to the language of the treaty and the
intent of the parties to answer the above questions in light of the facts
of each case. 9 The EEOC highlights that the Sumitomo holding
(that a company's place of incorporation controls the applicability of
the FCN treaty) is limited to the U.S.-Japan FCN treaty. Thus, the
Commission counsels the automatic use of the place of incorporation
test if the treaty is between the United States and Japan, but notes
that other FCN treaties must be evaluated based upon both their lan-
guage and intent as evidenced in their negotiating histories.14 °
The EEOC explicitly disagrees with the Seventh Circuit's con-
struction that a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary may assert its parent's
Rights Under Commercial Treaties to Hire Employees "Of Their Choice, 86 COLUM, L.
RFv. 139, 153-54 (1986). The Title VII coverage is subject to the foreign laws defense of
Section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note
2, at D-6.
135. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-7 to D-8.
136. See id. at D-7 (citing Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd., 685 F. Supp. 231,233 (M.D.
Ala. 1988), and Commission Decision No. 84-2, CCH Employment Practices Guide 6840
(1983).
137. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-8. Our concern here regards
Title VII but the EEOC adopts the identical premises for the ADA. The scope of this
Article entails private sector enterprises rather than government instrumentalities. The
latter enterprises may be exempt from regulation due to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1611 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991). EEOC Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 2, at D-12 n.15.
138. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-8.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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treaty rights if the parent dictated the discriminatory conduct of the
subsidiary.' 4' While the issue of asserting a parent's FCN treaty rights
was acknowledged but left unanswered in Sumitomo, the Commission
disagrees with Fortino and believes that allowing a U.S. subsidiary "to
assert its parent's treaty rights enables that subsidiary 'to accomplish
indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly"' (under the holding of
Sumitomo).42 However, EEOC offices within the jurisdiction of the
Seventh Circuit are bound to follow the rule in Fortino. Regarding
charges alleging discrimination in the United States by Japanese-
owned U.S. subsidiaries, the Commission directs its personnel there to
investigate the respondent's place of incorporation and whether the
conduct was dictated to the U.S. subsidiary by the Japanese parent.143
In all other circuits, the EEOC operates under a stricter construction
regarding the protections afforded by FCNs. 144
Even when a foreign employer doing business in the United
States is clearly operating under the aegis of an FCN, it remains to be
determined whether the employment practices in question are
shielded from charges of discrimination pursuant to FCEs. What posi-
tions and personnel actions are immune from Title VII scrutiny? The
EEOC looks to the facts of the charge and to the language and intent
of the treaty in question. 45
The EEOC Guidelines include a hypothetical example to illus-
trate the agency's position on this issue. In the example, the language
of an illustrative FCN treaty between the United States and a foreign
country states that "companies of either Party shall be permitted to
engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice.""' This provision is identical to the
FCE "of their choice" provision included in most FCN's. Typically,
Xcorp, a company incorporated in the country of X, would attempt to
avoid Title VII scrutiny and claim exemption for a wide range of em-
ployment practices pursuant to this treaty. However, should an appli-
cant be denied a clerical position in Xcorp's word-processing plant in
Georgia on the basis of the applicant's national origin, and an X na-
141. Id. (citing Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393 (noting that a parent's right may be asserted "at
least to the extent necessary to prevent the treaty from being set at naught").
142. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-8 (quoting Spiess, 725 F.2d at
973.
143. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-9.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tional is hired to fill the position, the EEOC suggests that Xcorp will
not succeed with a defense based on the FCN treaty. L47
The Commission's reasoning is that "the treaty's protection is
limited to the selection of 'accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists,"' and
thus, the treaty would not shield Xcorp from a discrimination charge
involving an employment practice relating to a clerical position.148
Clearly, Xcorp would be attempting to favor its citizens across the
board, as opposed to only those within the defined parameters of the
FCE clause. Accordingly, the EEOC attempts to prevent foreign em-
ployers from playing semantic games with job titles to reserve more
positions for their citizens than is permitted by treaty. In this context,
the Commission suggests that a job title may not be determinative and
that it will look to actual job duties.14 9
When determining whether a particular employment practice is
protected by a treaty, the EEOC also looks at the practice as it relates
to actions permitted by the treaty.1 50 For example, the Commission
reasons that a treaty which permits a foreign employer to "engage"
certain personnel of its choice, "probably also permits this employer
to fire these same personnel." 151 The EEOC's position is based upon
the Third Circuit's finding in MacNamara, that the right to "engage"
executives under the U.S.-Korean FCN treaty includes the right to ter-
minate current personnel and replace them with executives who share
the defendant's citizenship.152 However, the EEOC makes clear that
such a treaty protected right to hire and discharge personnel would
not extend to a right to engage in wage discrimination with impu-
nity.' 53 The Commission again urges a narrow reading of treaty rights
based on a strict interpretation of a given treaty. 54 The EEOC has
emphasized that each case is fact specific and that the extent of cover-
age of each FCN treaty and the FCE clause within it will vary depend-
147. lId
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. It should be noted that the citizenship protection does not allow foreign com-
panies operating in the United States "to select among American citizens on the basis of
their age, race, sex, religion, or national origin." I& (citing MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1143).
The MacNamara case is of particular import in that the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
allowing the Third Circuit's decision to stand. 493 U.S. 944 (1989). See generally Gras-
berger, supra note 12, at 141-150.
151. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-8.
152. 863 F.2d at 1141-42.
153. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at D-9.
154. Id.
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ing on the history, language, and intent of the parties.15 The circuit
courts are not bound by the EEOC's position, yet the agency's gui-
dance is entitled to a measure of deference.
V. CONCLUSION
"America is woven of many strands; I would recognize them and
let it so remain.... Our fate is to become one, and yet many."
Ralph Ellisoni5 6
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII has
covered discriminatory employment practices against United States
citizens abroad by U.S. or U.S.-controlled employers. Moreover,
equal employment opportunity statutes regulate discrimination by for-
eign companies within the United States regardless of whether the
charging party is a U.S. citizen. The extent of coverage, however, var-
ies depending on the existence and language of treaties or interna-
tional agreements and their negotiating histories.
When an FCN treaty exists, a balance must be struck between
international concerns of comity and domestic goals of eradicating dis-
crimination in the workplace. The purpose of FCN treaties is to as-
sure foreign corporations the right to conduct business on an equal
basis without suffering discrimination based on alienage. Even the
courts have acknowledged that the FCE clause in FCN treaties con-
fers a significant advantage. Where the FCE clause is invoked to pre-
fer the citizens of another country, it is also a possible violation of
Title VII's ban on national origin discrimination.
Thus far, courts have reached conflicting results regarding the in-
terrelationship of FCN Treaties and Title VII. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit has held that treaty language does not insulate a U.S.-
incorporated subsidiary's practices from Title VII scrutiny. The Sev-
enth Circuit, however, has ruled that discrimination in favor of one's
own citizens, an explicit FCN treaty right under an FCE clause, is not
subject to review under a Title VII national origin discrimination the-
ory. The Second Circuit acknowledged and attempted to reconcile the
two laws. The Seventh Circuit conceded the potential conflict, yet
avoided crafting a solution which would have recognized the reality
that national origin discrimination may arise out of an FCE clause
allowing companies to prefer citizens of another country.
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The EEOC has taken a position quite similar to the Second Cir-
cuit with the intent of limiting the scope of FCEs. While the EEOC
does not approve of the result reached by the Seventh Circuit, the
Commission will follow the Fortino rule within that Circuit. The Com-
mission has warned that foreign employers should reasonably antici-
pate being subjected to its enforcement process should any charge
arise directly from their businesses within the United iStates It treats
the place of incorporation as determinative when considering the
availability of FCE clause rights, and states that U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign corporations may not assert their parents' FCN treaty rights.
If a foreign company is covered by an FCN treaty, the EEOC will
assess whether the employment practices are covered by the treaty.
The EEOC will then consider the scope of protection granted by the
treaty. In making both determinations, the EEOC favors a restrictive
reading of the treaty rights and attempts to foster a greater awareness
of the antidiscrimination laws in light of foreign policy concerns.
The EEOC's recent Enforcement Guidance represents an impor-
tant step toward clarifying the confusion that surrounds; the interrela-
tionship of Title VII and FCN treaty rights. While this guidance is not
binding on the courts, it is a strong analysis of the relevant employ-
ment law faced by foreign multinational enterprises operating in the
United States, and it recognizes the reality that citizenship preferences
may really be a mask for national origin discrimination. The EEOC
has adopted a well-reasoned approach, one that tempers the theoreti-
cal direction of the Seventh Circuit, and balances the economic, legal
and political concerns of the parties. As the agency vested with en-
forcing Title VII, the EEOC is justly concerned with ensuring that
U.S. nationals are not unduly prejudiced by employment discrimina-
tion within the United States The policies behind U.S. equal employ-
ment laws are being increasingly accepted as basic human rights in the
global workplace.
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